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International Distribution of the Corporate Tax Base: Implications of 
Different Apportionment Factors under Unitary Taxation 
 
Alex Cobham and Simon Loretz 
 
 
Summary 
 
Under the current system of separate accounting, tax-motivated international profit shifting 
results in misalignment of profits and real economic activity. While the Organisation for 
Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) Base Erosion and Profit Shifting initiative 
aims to measure and curtail this, critics claim serious progress is only possible with greater 
emphasis on formulary apportionment methods (Picciotto 2013), or other methods outside 
the present international tax architecture (IMF 2014). In this paper we use the leading global 
database of company balance sheets to compare the distribution of profit and potential 
apportionment factors. Although data coverage is problematic for developing countries, we 
find that apportioning profit according to measures of actual economic activity would result in 
a major redistribution of the tax base at the expense of a particular group of jurisdictions, and 
in most cases towards the lower-income countries in the sample. International loss 
consolidation facilitated by a global switch to unitary taxation would reduce the overall tax 
base by around 12 per cent.  
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Introduction 
 
The growing importance of multinational corporations and their opportunity to reduce their tax 
bill via international reallocation of the corporate tax base has been a topic of considerable 
interest both to academic researchers and to policymakers.1 In light of the fiscal pressures 
arising from the recent financial crisis there has been further impetus to the debate by the 
OECD’s Base Erosion and Profit Shifting (BEPS) initiative, launched in 2013 with the backing 
of the G8 and G20 groups of countries. 
  
The UK’s Chancellor of the Exchequer, George Osborne, reflected the strength of criticism of 
the current system when he hailed the BEPS Action Plan as ‘a major step forward towards a 
global tax system that is fair and fit for purpose’.2 The Action Plan (OECD 2013) declares that 
‘A realignment of taxation and relevant substance is needed’ (p.13), and takes as its aim that 
it ‘should provide countries with domestic and international instruments that will better align 
rights to tax with economic activity’ (p.11).3  
 
Under the current system of separate accounting, profits of multinational companies are 
taxed in the respective countries in which they are earned. For the purpose of corporate 
taxation, the subsidiaries of these companies are treated as individual firms when it comes to 
calculation of the taxable profits.4 Given the persistent disparities in corporate tax rates, this 
creates an incentive for multinational companies to misallocate their taxable income with the 
aim of reducing their overall tax burden. There are a number of empirical studies using 
corporate balance sheet data which support the hypothesis that international profit shifting in 
response to tax differentials is statistically and economically significant within European 
Union (EU) and OECD countries.5  
 
Similar evidence for developing countries is lacking, reflecting the scarcity of balance sheet 
data. Instead researchers in this area have tended to focus on analysis of trade data, where 
abnormal pricing suggests large illicit outflows from developing countries, but where 
attribution to multinational tax practices is problematic – see, for example, the range of views 
among contributors to the World Bank’s major volume on illicit financial flows (Reuter 2012, 
including Eden 2012; Fuest and Riedel 2012; Leite 2012; Murphy 2012; and Nitsch 2012).  
 
In order to restrict tax-motivated relocation of corporate profits, increasingly complex 
approaches have emerged to transfer pricing, thin capitalisation, questions of permanent 
residence and related issues. The application of these rules varies widely, even between 
OECD member states, and a critical view is that BEPS is primarily addressing the difficulties 
of the system of separate accounting, rather than addressing the fundamental problem – the 
system itself. The International Monetary Fund (IMF), arguably the leading international 
institution in terms of developing country tax advice, has stated bluntly that ‘Current 
                                                            
1  For a recent survey on the topic, see Fuest et al. (2013).   
2  Osborne’s comments were made in the UK government’s press release at <https://www.gov.uk/government/news/g20-
next-stage-in-securing-new-global-standard-for-tackling-avoidance-and-evasion-reached> (accessed 10 March 2014).  
3  It is interesting that the OECD has set this target for the BEPS initiative, since alignment of profit and economic activity 
is not the aim of the current system. Under the separate accounting approach misalignments will reflect not only tax 
motivated ‘profit shifting’, but also differences in the actual profitability of different entities within a particular multinational 
group. There is also no articulated theoretical basis for alignment as a goal of international tax rules - a potentially 
important avenue for future research. 
4  For a detailed description on the historical origins and the resulting shortcomings of the current international tax system 
see Picciotto (2013).  
5  See Grubert and Mutti (1991) for early evidence for the US; Huizinga and Laeven (2008), Weichenrieder (2009) and 
Loretz and Mokkas (2011) for more recent evidence for European multinationals.  
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initiatives, which operate within the present international tax architecture, will not eliminate 
spillovers’ (IMF 2014: 35).6 
 
The alternative of unitary taxation has been proposed: treating each multinational group of 
companies as a unit, regardless of the geographical and juridical location of the individual 
subsidiaries; calculating profit and loss on a group-wide basis; and then allocating the taxing 
rights on this consolidated profit between the jurisdictions with which the group has a nexus, 
according to the extent of actual economic activity. Systems of unitary taxation with formula 
apportionment currently exist only at the national level, most notably in the United States 
(US), Canada and Switzerland, and - for local business tax - in Germany. There is also a 
longstanding proposal of the European Commission (2011) to extend unitary taxation and 
formulary apportionment to the whole of the European Union under the Common 
Consolidated Corporate Tax Base (CCCTB).  
 
In practice, OECD transfer pricing guidelines allow a range of methods to allocate (or 
apportion) profit between entities within a group, so rather than seeing a choice between 
polar opposite systems it is possible to think of changes within the current framework that 
would make the extent of apportionment more coherent and transparent (Picciotto 2013). As 
such, research into the distributive implications of full global apportionment also shed light on 
the direction of travel that would follow from more gradual steps. 
 
The underlying idea of the allocation formulae (which may typically include assets, sales and 
employment) is that they should reflect economic substance: that is, they should reflect the 
location of corporate economic activity across countries. As such, any assessment of tax 
base redistribution under a particular formula will to some extent reflect the misalignment 
between current profit declaration and the location of economic activity, as captured by the 
formula in question. The disparity between the allocation of the apportionment factors and 
the taxable profit is likely also to reflect differences in productivity or in the valuation of the 
apportionment factor in question, and therefore might have non-tax reasons. Therefore any 
strong conclusions about tax-induced misalignment should be drawn with utmost care. 
 
Sales factors reflect the demand for goods and services, while labour and assets reflect the 
supply process. There is no ‘true’ formula that objectively captures the location of economic 
activity, but a number of formulae are in operation or have been proposed, and this paper 
considers a range of these. The specific apportionment formula chosen is likely to have 
substantial redistributive consequences – given that proposals for unitary taxation originate 
largely from the observation that profits are misaligned under the current system, 
redistribution of taxable income is the logical consequence.  
 
The most active proponents of international formulary apportionment have been EU 
countries, suggesting they are expecting to benefit in the form of more tax base allocated to 
them. At the same time, critics of the current system have long highlighted that reliance on 
transfer pricing and the arm’s length principle may produce a systematic distortion of the tax 
base away from developing countries.7 While both OECD countries and developing countries 
could plausibly gain tax base at the expense of low tax jurisdictions with disproportionate 
profit declaration, the identity of the winners and losers will depend on the nature of the 
current distribution of declared profits and on the precise formula used. While there has been 
some analysis of revenue effects of different formulae for the US and the European Union, it 
has not yet been investigated at a worldwide level.  
 
                                                            
6  Rather than emphasise profit misalignment, the IMF uses the broader concept of spillovers in international corporate 
taxation (defined as the effect of one country’s rules and practices on others). IMF (2014: 1) highlights that adverse 
spillovers are ‘especially marked and important for developing countries’.  
7  See, for example, Cobham and McNair (2012).  
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This paper aims to investigate the revenue consequences of various apportionment factors, 
with the particular intention of extending knowledge of the distributional implications beyond 
the major industrialised countries. There are reasons to think that the current system of 
separate accounting and transfer pricing may raise particular difficulties for developing 
countries (OECD 2014). The pattern of investment may also differ, with lower-income 
countries receiving a greater share of vertical investment focused on resource extraction and 
use of low cost labour, compared to horizontal investment, primarily for market access 
reasons. Differences in factor prices in lower-income countries are also likely to have a direct 
impact on the revenue consequences of the choice of apportionment factor. At the same time 
it is crucial to point out that we fully abstract from behavioural changes of multinational 
companies in response to the move towards unitary taxation with formula apportionment. 
Insofar as we believe that part of the redistribution of the corporate tax base is due to profit 
shifting activities under the current system, it is very likely that companies will adjust their 
behaviour and that allocation of real assets will be affected by corporate taxation. This is a 
very important aspect of a change towards unitary taxation which is beyond the scope of this 
paper, but certainly needs to be the focus of future research. 
 
Finally, data availability presents a particular challenge in assessing tax changes in lower-
income countries. Hence this study aims to both explore what we can learn from available 
data, and highlight where data shortcomings are particularly pronounced. In this way the 
current study fits with Action 11 of the BEPS initiative, aiming to ‘establish methodologies to 
collect and analyse data on BEPS and the actions to address it’. Data availability in respect 
of lower-income countries is likely to be a major problem for the OECD when ensuring that 
their baseline data and subsequent monitoring has global coverage. 
 
We use the largest commercially-available database of company balance sheets, Orbis, 
provided by Bureau van Dijk. Using a dataset of up to 211,360 individual companies in 
26,795 corporate groups, we simulate the static distributional consequences of a number of 
different apportionment factors. The most obvious finding is that coverage is severely limited 
among developing countries, and increasingly so for lower-income countries. Despite the 
large number of firms in the initial dataset, the level of reporting for lower-income countries is 
insufficient to predict revenue consequences reliably. The challenge for the OECD BEPS 
initiative is clear. 
 
Nevertheless, our study highlights some interesting aspects of a move towards unitary 
taxation and formula apportionment. A first robust finding is that the implicit introduction of 
international loss consolidation would reduce the overall corporate tax base significantly – in 
our sample of firms for the years 2003-2011 by more than 10 per cent. Furthermore, the 
exact design of the apportionment mechanism will be crucial for the distribution of the 
corporate tax base between countries. While this result is neither surprising nor new, it 
highlights the likely political difficulties that would arise in seeking multilateral agreement on a 
specific formula.  
 
The analysis in this paper is based on all the countries in the world participating in the move 
to unitary taxation with formula apportionment. In reality it is much more likely that tax havens 
and other countries benefitting from the current separate accounting system will opt to stay 
out of a unitary taxation system. We do not model this in the current paper, but previous 
results have shown that if only high tax countries move to a formula apportionment system, 
in relation to profits arising within their own economies, the revenue consequences will be 
much less pronounced.8 Alternatively, a country or economic region (e.g. the EU or the East 
African Community) might unilaterally decide to apply unitary taxation in order to determine 
their apportioned share of the worldwide profits of multinational groups operating in their 
                                                            
8  For example, Devereux and Loretz (2008) model only a sub-group of countries participating in the proposed CCCTB 
and find the distributional consequences are much smaller.  
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jurisdiction. The results here shed light on the potential scale of change in the tax base 
before the effect of any subsequent decisions about tax rates and the location of economic 
activity. 
 
Despite the shortcomings of the data, a remarkably clear picture emerges. Of the countries 
with sufficient data, those with lower per capita income would benefit from apportionment 
according to either tangible assets or number of employees. In contrast, apportionment 
according to turnover or cost of employees will allocate a larger share to higher income 
countries. Similarly a two-part apportionment formula in the spirit of Avi-Yonah et al. (2009) 
would also benefit high-income high-tax countries (here the assumed rate of return on 
operating expenses crucially affects the results). Finally we investigate the impact on tax 
revenue, which seems to be slightly positive (in the range of two to four per cent) – although 
strong assumptions are necessary to make such an estimate.  
 
The paper is structured as follows. Section 1 discusses the literature on unitary taxation and 
formulary apportionment. Section 2 outlines algebraically the approach taken to 
apportionment, including the role of international loss consolidation. Section 3 presents the 
data and outlines the empirical approach, with the results being set out in Section 4. A final 
section concludes.  
 
 
1  Previous literature 
 
Given the gap in research addressing the empirical implications of a shift to unitary taxation 
for lower-income countries, this paper is most closely related to two different research 
questions. One strand of literature is mostly concerned with profit shifting out of the US, and 
investigates how much more tax base would be allocated to the US if they were to extend 
unitary taxation and formula apportionment to the worldwide income of US-headquartered 
multinationals. Shackelford and Slemrod (1998) use segmental reporting data, and show that 
46 of the largest US firms would face a 38 per cent increase in their tax burden. Clausing and 
Lahav (2011) update the analysis of Shackelford and Slemrod, but find only a modest 
increase of the tax base in the US. While this approach is appealing because it uses 
consolidated group profits as a starting point, it is highly data-demanding and therefore was 
only conducted for a small number of companies. Furthermore, segmental reporting does not 
usually allow identification of the distribution of the apportionment factors in all countries, and 
hence the two studies are limited to the revenue impacts on the headquarters economy.  
 
A range of studies have considered the application of formulary apportionment within 
national borders. Mintz and Smart (2004) find that apportionment between Canadian 
provinces results in substantially less income shifting. Where Canada has a common formula 
(based on sales and wages), US states can apply their own factors. Clausing (2014: 25) 
assesses the experience in the US, and finds ‘some cautious optimism for advocates of 
international formulary apportionment. Formulary apportionment has the potential to reduce 
income-shifting incentives without generating accompanying large tax responses in 
economic activity such as employment and investment’.  
 
A different approach is used in papers addressing the revenue impact of various potential 
apportionment factors in the context of European tax harmonisation. Here the approach is 
bottom-up, as the information of the subsidiaries is aggregated to obtain the geographical 
distribution of the profits and the apportionment factors. Fuest et al. (2007) use data about 
German inbound and outbound foreign direct investment (FDI), while Devereux and Loretz 
(2008) use international data to investigate the same questions. Aside from the higher quality 
of the German administrative data used by Fuest et al. (2007) and the broader coverage in 
the international data used by Devereux and Loretz (2008), the main difference in approach 
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is that the latter explicitly model the impact of international loss consolidation. Devereux and 
Loretz (2008) also investigate the impact of a voluntary system of formula apportionment, 
since this is discussed in the European Union.  
 
The core of the current paper is an extension of Devereux and Loretz (2008) to all countries 
for which equivalent balance sheet data is available. In addition to the apportionment factors 
proposed by Agúndez-García (2006), we also consider the two-part apportionment discussed 
in Avi-Yonah et al. (2009). This method allocates ordinary profits according to the 
geographical distribution of operating expenses, and excess profits are then allocated 
according to additional factors (e.g. assets). Very recently IMF (2014) uses Bureau of 
Economic Analysis investment data on US outbound FDI to investigate the impact of different 
apportionment factors on tax revenue in selected advanced and emerging countries. This 
provides a sample with broad international coverage in terms of host economies, but narrow 
by home economy (i.e. US only). In addition, data is from survey responses rather than 
audited accounts. Nonetheless there are important commonalities in the findings, which we 
discuss briefly in Section 4. 
 
 
2  Mechanisms of formula apportionment and 
loss consolidation 
 
The main question we are concerned with in this paper is which countries could benefit from 
a move to unitary taxation through a larger corporate tax base being apportioned to them 
(once international loss consolidation is allowed for). Note that apportionment of a larger tax 
base need not necessarily imply higher ultimate revenue, since the change in system would 
change both states’ incentives for setting rates, and corporate incentives for the location of 
economic activity. Nonetheless, relative changes in tax base are significant to the extent that 
they reflect the relative power of states in terms of any subsequent revenue-investment 
trade-off. 
 
To answer this question this section first sets out to describe the basic mechanism of formula 
apportionment, and how we can compare the tax base under separate accounting to the 
hypothetically-apportioned tax base under unitary taxation with different formulae. Then we 
highlight the role of international loss consolidation under unitary taxation.  
 
2.1 Basic mechanism of formula apportionment  
 
Let  denote the declared, taxable profit of corporate group j in country i. The total declared 
taxable profit of the group across all ௝ܰ countries in which it operates, is then given by 
1
jN
j ij
i


  .  
 
Under the current system of separate accounting the corporate group is liable to corporate 
taxation on its profit in each country ij  at the corporate tax rate i .9 For the moment, let us 
assume that the group is profitable in all countries where it operates. Hence under separate 
accounting the total tax revenue of each country is i given by: 
                                                            
9  Note that for reasons of simplicity we do not distinguish between one or many subsidiaries of the same corporate group 
in a given country. In countries where (loss) consolidation between members of a group is not possible, this distinction 
might be important.  
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1
iJ
SA
i i ij
j
T  

  (1) 
where iJ denotes the number of groups country i.  
 
In contrast, under a unitary taxation approach the taxable profit of the corporate group is 
aggregated first, and then taxing rights are allocated to the individual countries according to a 
formula. Abstracting from the possibility that countries chose their own formula this yields 
total tax revenue for each country of:  
1
iJ
UT
i i ijX j
j
T  

   (2) 
 
where ijX is the share of the total profit allocated to country i  if factor X is used to apportion 
the profits among the ௝ܰ countries in which group j operates, and is defined according to:  
1
0 1
j
ij
ijX N
iji
X
X


    (3) 
 
Note that the share of the apportionment factor is bounded between zero and unity under 
normal circumstances (i.e. the apportionment factor is non-negative in all countries).  
In the case of the two-part apportionment process proposed by Avi-Yonah et al. (2009) the 
apportionment factor will be  
1
1
0 1 1
j
j
N
ijij iji
ijX N
j j iji
p EpE X
X
 

         

  (4) 
 
where ijE denotes the operating expenses of group j in country i , and p  the assumed 
standard return to the expenses.  
 
In consequence country i will receive higher tax revenue from group j under unitary taxation 
if the following condition is fulfilled: 
1 1
j j
ij ij ijUT SA
ij ij ijXN N
jij iji i
X
T T
X
  
        (5) 
 
The condition in (5) simply states that a country will receive more tax revenue from a 
multinational group if the share of the apportionment factor in the country is bigger than the 
share of profits reported in the country under separate accounting.  
 
To generalise, this will hold for the overall corporate tax revenue of the country by using the 
average over all multinational groups with a taxable nexus in the country.10 That is, if the 
average share of the apportionment factor ( ijX ) across all groups is larger than the average 
share of profit, tax revenue will be higher under unitary taxation. Denoting the average 
worldwide profit of multinationals with a nexus in the country as j , and the average profit 
in this country of these multinationals ij , we have: 
                                                            
10  Note that the last steps in equations (6) and (9) only work if the number of groups with a taxable nexus does not change 
through the switch from separate accounting to unitary taxation. For example, in the case of apportionment by sales by 
destination this could imply the use of throwback rules.  
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1 1
1 1
1 1 1
i i
i i
i j i
J J
J J
ij ij ijj jUT SA UT SA
i i ij ij ijXJ N J
j j jij jj j j
X
T T T T
X
  
    
       
       (6) 
 
In other words, a country will receive more tax revenue from multinational groups if the 
average share of the apportionment factor for all groups in the country is bigger than the 
average share of profits reported in the country under separate accounting.  
 
Finally, note that for any given formula which is considered to reflect actual economic activity 
(e.g. an equally-weighted combination of sales, employment and fixed assets), the ratio of 
tax revenue – or equally, of tax bases, since the  will drop out – under unitary and separate 
accounting will provide a measure of the misalignment between profit and activity.  
 
2.2 The role of (international) loss consolidation  
 
An additional aspect to be considered is the consolidation of losses within the corporate 
group. In most countries corporations do not get immediate relief for losses, but rather can 
use the losses against profits in other subsidiaries in the same country, or carry them forward 
to be offset against future profits. However, with very few exceptions losses cannot be offset 
against profits made in subsidiaries in other countries.11  
 
This situation changes when group-wide profit is calculated under unitary taxation. The 
resulting elimination of differences in the treatment of domestic and foreign losses is a major 
argument used by the EU in support of a move to CCCTB. These considerations have an 
important effect on tax revenue both under the current system and proposals for unitary 
taxation. Under the current system the taxable income and tax liabilities of an individual firm
j in country i  need to be adjusted to reflect the loss carry forward and the asymmetric 
treatment of profit and losses. Let t denote the taxable year and , 1ij t   the losses brought 
forward into the period, one can rewrite the taxable income and the loss carry forward of 
current period as 
 
, , , 1max(0,( ))
SA SA
ij t ij t ij t      and , , , 1min(0,( ))SA SAij t ij t ij t     , (7) 
 
which can then be aggregated to the total taxable profit under separate accounting 
,
, ,
1
j tN
SA SA
j t ij t
i


  . 
 
Under a unitary taxation approach, losses in individual countries will be immediately offset 
against the profits elsewhere, and losses will only be carried forward at the corporate group 
level. Hence the profit and the loss carry forward will be  
 
,, , 1max(0,( ))j t
UT UT UT
j t j t     and , , 1 , 1min(0,( ))UT UT UTij t j t j t     . (8) 
 
Hence with the current asymmetric loss treatment, the total corporate tax base will be 
different depending on the tax system. Changing from a system of separate accounting to 
unitary taxation may have a short-run transition effect because of stocks of losses in the 
                                                            
11  One notable exception is Austria, which has a very generous loss consolidation system for Austrian-headquartered 
companies.  
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respective countries.12 However, even abstracting from this short-run transition effect, the 
switch from separate accounting to unitary taxation has two counteracting effects on the 
overall tax base. First, there is the direct effect that more losses are usable immediately, 
which has a depressing effect on the overall tax base. At the same time, the fact that losses 
are more likely to be used immediately implies that the stock of losses to be carried forward 
will be smaller. This has a positive impact on the overall tax base. Which of the two effects 
dominates depends on the level and the variance of the expected profits. 
 
Taking into account that the overall tax base will be different under the two tax systems, the 
condition under which any individual country will be better off can now be written as.  
, ,
, ,
, , ,
, ,1 1 ,
, , , , ,1 1
, , ,1 1 1
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A country will receive relatively more tax base under unitary taxation if the average share of 
the apportionment factor is bigger than the average ratio between the profit under separate 
accounting to the total taxable profit under unitary taxation.  
 
A final complication arises when the two-part apportionment proposed by Avi-Yonah et al. 
(2009) is used. If the overall profit of the corporate group is positive but smaller than the 
assumed return on expenses, the residual profit to be apportioned in the second stage is 
negative which can result in an overall negative tax base allocated to some countries. In this 
case we set the apportionment factor in this country to zero. Technically this implies that the 
inequality in equation (4) does not necessarily hold, since it is possible that the assumed 
return on expenses is larger than the overall profits.  
 
 
3  Data and empirical approach 
 
To address the questions raised here one would ideally have access to country-by-country 
reporting of profits and losses, as well as of the relevant apportionment factors. At present 
this is not available for all companies worldwide. However, international civil society 
campaigning has resulted in its being required for extractive sector companies listed in the 
EU and USA, and the OECD has been mandated by the G8 and G20 groups of countries to 
create a standard for private country-by-country reporting to tax authorities.13  
 
3.1 Data 
 
In the current absence of the ideal dataset, we use the largest available dataset of firm-level 
accounts, Orbis, provided by Bureau van Dijk. Orbis contains the balance sheet, profit and 
loss accounts, and most crucially the ownership structure, of all registered companies 
worldwide. For a subset of headquarter countries, both the consolidated and the 
unconsolidated accounts are available. For the main approach of this paper we follow 
Devereux and Loretz (2008), and aggregate the individual unconsolidated accounts to obtain 
the necessary country-by-country information. This results in an incomplete picture, since 
information is often unavailable for some of the subsidiaries within a group. In addition, 
                                                            
12  It is not clear whether one would want to include stocks of losses into the calculation of current taxable profits. There is 
also the proposed solution that stocks of losses may be carried forward against the tax liability resulting from the 
apportioned share of profits. 
13  Part of the basis for the international civil society campaign has been, precisely, its potential to demonstrate the 
misalignment of profits and activity, and, for some, to make the case for unitary taxation. See e.g. Murphy (2008) on the 
country-by-country proposal and the argument for the wider public to be able to scrutinise multinational groups’ tax 
payments.  
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where there are non-random reasons for information to be missing (e.g. accounts in low-tax 
jurisdictions are less likely to be included in the dataset), this will result in systematic biases 
to the results. Notwithstanding these issues, however, our view is that at the current moment 
Orbis provides the best opportunity to consider patterns among multinational groups of global 
origin – albeit from a limited field. 
  
In principle the Orbis online database contains all firms worldwide, and currently amounts to 
approximately 100 million entries.14 However, for the vast majority of these companies there 
is only very basic information, such as name and address. At the same time, any switch from 
separate accounting to unitary taxation will not directly affect small independent and purely 
domestic companies. Therefore the starting point of the analysis is to identify which 
companies will be affected by a switch to unitary taxation. Since this study focuses on the 
revenue effects of different apportionment factors, and is not concerned with other important 
aspects of a change towards unitary taxation, the companies which will be affected need to 
be multinational groups. We define multinational groups as corporate groups which own at 
least one subsidiary in a different country. We define ownership as owning either directly or 
indirectly more than 50 per cent, which implies that we can allocate any subsidiary 
unambiguously to its owner. Further we exclude public authorities or individuals owning 
corporate groups. In cases where a multinational group is globally owned by individuals or 
public authorities, we use the highest-level corporate owner as the global owner.15  
 
This results in a sample of 322,525 individual corporate entities in 29,984 groups. Table 1 
shows the basic sample allocated into broad country groups. The columns depict the location 
of the respective subsidiary, while the rows show the location of the owner. It becomes 
evident that Orbis data is dominated by European companies, and that there is very little 
information about developing countries. Nevertheless, this is still the most comprehensive 
dataset with which to investigate the question at hand.  
 
All databases from Bureau van Dijk including Orbis provide information about the last ten 
years. Given that accounts are reported with some delay and the information for the year 
2012 is still incomplete, this implies that we can use a time window of nine years, namely 
from 2003 to 2011. However, for some companies not all the necessary information is 
available for all years. To maximise the coverage we calculate the resulting tax base 
allocation for each factor separately, which results in different sample sizes for the different 
variables. 
 
                                                            
14  The 100 million companies also include a large number of public authorities, e.g. universities or hospitals, which are not 
relevant for the purpose of our analysis. For comparison, OpenCorporates.com has data on 62 million companies (as at 
7 January 2014).  
15  It is noteworthy that Bureau Van Dijk only reports the ownership information on a cross-sectional basis. This implies that 
newer ownership information replaces previous information, and all the information about the group structure is based 
on the information available at the time of the download (Autumn 2013).  
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Table 1 Number of firms in MNE groups, by location and owner country groups 
 
European 
Union 
Other 
Europe
North 
America
Asia Australasia Latin 
America 
Caribbean Central 
American
North Africa 
Middle East
Sub-Saharan 
Africa 
Total 
European Union 177,275 10,246 9,025 2,651 387 1,326 23 10 632 138 201,713 
Other Europe 8,785 11,742 908 342 71 100 4 2 57 8 22,019 
North America 27,736 1,165 23,095 1,997 366 767 23 13 113 12 55,287 
Asia 7,220 502 4,218 19,585 204 198 40 3 67 11 32,048 
Australasia 1,529 52 406 145 384 32 3 0 4 2 2,557 
Latin America 324 13 137 11 3 512 1 4 2 5 1012 
Caribbean 3,055 424 396 393 24 49 89 5 2 2 4,439 
Central American 83 11 23 1 0 2 2 8 0 0 130 
North Africa/Middle 
East 
1,633 126 257 36 5 14 0 0 522 1 2,594 
Sub-Saharan Africa 571 19 40 19 15 17 1 0 3 41 726 
Total 228,211 24,300 38,505 25,180 1,459 3,017 186 45 1,402 220 322,525 
Notes: The columns describe the region in which the subsidiary is located, while the rows describe the region of the group headquarters.  
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Table 2 reports the basic statistics for the profit measure and the apportionment factors used. 
Overall we have the necessary information for about 200,000 distinct companies in more 
than 26,000 groups. Only for payroll does the number of companies covered fall significantly, 
to 147,054 companies.16  
 
Table 2 Descriptive statistics profit and loss and apportionment factors 
 
Observations Mean Standard 
deviation
Minimum Maximum Distinct 
companies 
Distinct 
groups
Profit/loss before taxes 1,363,640  9.84 716.00 -76800.00 763,000.00 211,448 26,801
Turnover 1,241,751  118.00 1240.00 0.00 352,000.00 198,288 26,341
Tangible assets 1,272,769  26.10 575.00 0.00 453,000.00 199,844 26,397
Total assets 1,359,831  513.00 11200.00 0.00 2,480,000.00 211,360 26,795
Payroll  911,999  11.80 87.80 0.00 17,100.00 147,054 23,824
No. of employees  1,021,917  244.15 2321.996 0.00 961,000.00 182,481 25,393
Taxation 1,241,044  1.69 63.8 -5310 42,700.00 201,583 26,460
Notes: All values except number of employees and the number of companies and groups are in million USD. All observations with 
negative values for the apportionment factors are dropped.  
 
The use of this dataset has at least two relevant dimensions, along which a selection bias 
can occur. The first occurs when specific types of companies (e.g. companies in low-tax 
countries, or very large or very profitable ones) are either not included in the database at all, 
or have missing or false ownership information. The second occurs when specific companies 
do not report the variables necessary for our analysis. While it is difficult to judge whether the 
overall coverage is good and whether ownership information is reliable, we can at least 
investigate the relative coverage across countries to see whether there is a strong selection 
in terms of coverage. While for most factors the number of companies dropping out from the 
initial sample is evenly distributed across countries, there appears to be a relevant bias for 
the employment and payroll factor. For the latter this becomes very evident with a few 
countries dropping out completely because of insufficient payroll numbers being reported.  
 
Particular issues arise with using Orbis to look across countries at different income levels 
(rather than, for example, comparing within the EU only). One is that the requirements of 
financial accounting may be more variable. Another is that many developing countries use 
tax holidays or special rates to a greater extent than industrialised countries, and so it is not 
always clear to what extent lower tax revenue may be due to a small tax base or to a low 
(preferential) rate being applied. Since there is no plausible way to infer from financial 
accounts the applied tax rate, we first circumvent this problem by only analysing how the 
corporate tax base would be affected. In a second step we use the reported tax payments as 
the starting point for the tax base, at the potential cost of significant measurement errors.  
 
3.2 Empirical approach  
 
To simulate the tax base effect of a move to unitary taxation with formula apportionment we 
need information about the tax base under separate accounting ( ,
SA
j t ), the tax base under 
unitary taxation ( ,
UT
j t ) and the apportionment factors ( ijX ). The simplest way to measure 
the tax base is to use profit and loss before tax (PLBT) as reported in the accounts. In order 
to account for the possibility of domestic loss consolidation and loss carry forwards, we 
aggregate PLBT at the country-firm level and carry the losses forward to be set off against 
future profits as in equation (7). Similarly we aggregate PLBT at the firm level and carry 
                                                            
16  In order to minimise further attrition of the database we linearly interpolate missing values before we calculate the 
hypothetical loss carry forward. We also set the initial stock of losses brought into the first period as zero. 
  
 
 
17
remaining losses forward as in equation (8). The main alternative tax base measure is 
derived from reported tax payments in the accounts. In line with the approach in Devereux 
and Loretz (2008), we define the tax base as the positive tax payments divided through the 
statutory corporate tax rate. In the case of a non-positive tax payment, we use the lower 
value of earnings before interest and taxation (EBIT) and the ratio between the tax payment 
and the statutory tax rate. 
 
For the apportionment factors we use total assets (ASSETS) and tangible assets (TANG) as 
a measure for capital invested, turnover (TURN) as a proxy for sales by origin, the number of 
employees (EMP) and the cost of employees (PAY) as employment factors.17 For the two-
part approach by Avi-Yonah et al (2009), we define operating expenses as the difference 
between TURN and EBIT. After assuming a one (five) per cent ordinary return, we apportion 
the excess profits according to ASSETS. 
 
The lack of coverage for lower-income countries, the absence of any information about sales 
by destination, and comparison with the results of Shackelford and Slemrod (1998) and 
Clausing and Lahav (2009), are the main motives for also using consolidated data. The 
International Financial Reporting Standards require large companies to provide segmental 
reporting along business lines and geographical markets. Unfortunately the geographic 
reporting is not standardised, so it is not feasible to use the full geographic breakdown. 
Nevertheless, for 3,667 corporations in 32 different countries we are able to identify the 
proportion of profits, sales and assets in the domestic segment. Then we compare the profits 
reported in the home country to the profits which would be allocated to the home country if 
sales or assets had been used as an apportionment factor.  
 
 
4  Empirical results 
 
4.1 Tax base effects 
 
This section presents some of the basic results. For reasons of space we only present the 
country-by-country results for the largest sample with formula apportionment according to 
total assets. For all other apportionment factors the detailed results can be found in the 
Appendix Tables, having the same structure. To give an indication of the representativeness 
of the results, the first column presents the average number of firms the results are based 
on. The next column presents the simple sum of profit and loss before taxes in the country, 
reported in million USD. This is the sum over all firms located in this country and over the 
years 2003 through to 2011. The third column presents the percentage change if we adjust 
the sum of the profit and loss measure for domestic group relief and loss carry forward. 
Specifically, we aggregate profits and losses within the same country, and we carry 
remaining losses forward and set them off against profits in the next periods. The last two 
columns present the core results of this paper, namely the impact on the corporate tax base 
through a move to unitary taxation and apportionment. To separate partly the effects of loss 
consolidation and apportionment, we compare the allocated tax base under unitary taxation 
first to the simple sum of profit and losses in [2], and then to the tax base measure which is 
already adjusted for loss carry forward and group relief within the same country in [3].  
 
Table 3 reports the baseline results for total assets as apportionment factor. The rather large 
and positive changes in column [3] show that losses played a significant role in the period 
investigated. Compared to simply aggregating profit and losses before taxation in column [2], 
                                                            
17  All the proposals and existing systems have sales by destination rather than sales by origin as an apportionment factor. 
Since we are not able to obtain sales by destination and also cannot distinguish between inter-company and customer 
sales, we have to rely on turnover as a proxy for the sales factor.  
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the modelling of group relief and loss carry forward increases the measure of the corporate 
tax base significantly. The simple sum of profit and losses in column [2] would imply an 
immediate recognition of tax losses, which is clearly not realistic. Therefore we think that 
column [3] is a more realistic benchmark. Nevertheless the comparison between the two 
measures gives an indication of the extent to which the treatment of losses matters. China 
and Greece are clearly outliers because some of the largest losses in our dataset are 
reported in a Chinese subsidiary and a Greek bank, but overall the loss consolidation or 
carry forward makes up a significant share.18 Even for countries where the coverage is broad 
and therefore a few large loss-making companies should matter less, the modelling of loss 
carry forward increases the tax base measure by 20 per cent (France) to 30 per cent (United 
Kingdom). 
 
Concerning the change from separate accounting to unitary taxation with apportionment 
according to total assets, the results in column [5] surprisingly show that primarily Belgium 
will gain corporate tax base on a large scale, while most other countries lose compared to 
the scenario in column [3]. This again highlights that in the period observed losses are 
playing an important role. While the positive results in column [3] indicate that there are a lot 
of losses which can not be offset within the own country and therefore are only carried 
forward, the primarily negative result in column [5] tells a story that group-wide consolidation 
under unitary taxation would allow firms to use at least a part of the losses currently trapped 
in individual countries. Thus the effect of international loss consolidation will on average 
shrink significantly - by 13.4 per cent - the overall tax base available to distribute. 
Multinational groups would experience a corresponding reduction in the disincentive to make 
risky investments in new countries that results from current arrangements.  
                                                            
18  Iceland is an even larger outlier, with the overall sum of the tax base measure being negative.  
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Table 3 Baseline results for total assets as apportionment factor 
No. 
firms 
Sum profit and 
loss before taxes
% change through 
group relief and 
losses carried 
forward
% change under unitary taxation
Relative to [2] Relative to tax base 
measure underlying 
[3]
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5]
Argentina 15 679.31 36.6% 164.1% 93.3%
Australia 233 248,254.49 7.5% 7.5% 0.0%
Austria 2,376 136,956.72 22.1% -1.4% -19.2%
Belgium 6,178 305,520.39 33.3% 78.5% 33.9%
Bosnia Herzegovina 217 964.58 73.2% 78.7% 3.2%
Brazil 228 84,875.08 6.1% -28.6% -32.7%
Bulgaria 559 12,552.12 23.8% -0.5% -19.6%
Chile 20 38,317.72 0.5% -72.3% -72.4%
China 754 22,501.51 305.4% 254.9% -12.5%
Colombia 299 30,024.14 5.5% -14.2% -18.7%
Croatia 870 13,146.01 32.7% -12.8% -34.3%
Cyprus 10 3,175.48 2.1% -35.0% -36.3%
Czech Republic 3,842 96,163.61 10.9% -30.6% -37.5%
Denmark 2,411 137,370.11 27.6% 13.9% -10.8%
Estonia 1,074 11,977.64 14.0% -29.9% -38.5%
Finland 3,059 106,247.17 21.3% -4.2% -21.0%
France 23,109 1,390,729.50 20.6% 6.8% -11.4%
Germany 11,153 772,192.12 30.6% 17.8% -9.8%
Greece 899 1,044.08 4,302.7% 3,319.5% -22.3%
Hungary 769 89,504.92 10.1% -59.5% -63.2%
Iceland 114 -7,195.50 -163.5% -145.0% -29.1%
India 336 22,738.74 32.3% -23.4% -42.1%
Indonesia 12 0.00 0.0% 1,283.33 1,283.33
Ireland 2,080 81,212.61 134.3% 123.8% -4.5%
Italy 11,682 387,360.13 50.2% 42.4% -5.2%
Japan 4,642 522,716.17 4.9% -2.8% -7.3%
Kazakhstan 69 3,050.68 44.0% -72.3% -80.7%
Latvia 398 1,569.92 210.6% 111.5% -31.9%
Lithuania 382 8,087.82 28.8% 10.4% -14.2%
Luxembourg 929 123,380.03 93.2% 99.5% 3.2%
Macedonia 13 368.28 16.1% -41.1% -49.2%
Malta 135 18,844.27 19.1% -24.8% -36.9%
Mexico 193 35,743.75 21.7% -49.1% -58.2%
Montenegro 12 231.01 79.3% 32.2% -26.2%
Netherlands 4,157 673,708.62 25.7% 13.9% -9.4%
New Zealand 99 3,544.38 8.9% -23.0% -29.3%
Norway 6,061 435,510.78 11.6% -11.1% -20.3%
Peru 49 18,011.34 0.6% -38.2% -38.5%
Philippines 165 10,799.52 7.0% -19.8% -25.0%
Poland 4,490 157,218.02 15.0% -23.5% -33.5%
Portugal 2,356 108,700.20 18.1% -4.5% -19.2%
Romania 2,476 27,036.24 54.2% 15.6% -25.0%
Russia 2,964 349,608.91 6.8% -14.8% -20.2%
Serbia 897 2,685.57 249.7% 166.9% -23.7%
Singapore 400 168,812.62 3.3% -22.2% -24.6%
Slovak Republic 891 26,241.98 24.0% 0.5% -18.9%
Slovenia 214 5,228.90 46.1% 57.0% 7.5%
South Korea 1,058 455,117.80 8.6% -2.2% -9.9%
Spain 11,038 562,483.36 31.9% 5.6% -19.9%
Sweden 4,846 381,676.92 28.6% 2.8% -20.1%
Switzerland 129 61,223.95 10.9% 4.2% -6.0%
Taiwan 155 110,691.72 15.6% 12.1% -3.0%
Turkey 87 37,827.49 3.7% -29.2% -31.7%
Ukraine 874 30,103.59 22.0% -20.0% -34.4%
United Kingdom 29,166 3,778,569.50 51.2% 28.3% -15.2%
United States 668 220,764.94 7.4% -6.8% -13.2%
Total 152,313 12,325,871.00 32.5% 14.7% -13.4%
Notes: No. firms refers to the average (over the period 2003-2011) number of firms these results are based on. All countries 
with less than 10 firms on average in all apportionment factors are excluded. Sum profit and loss refers to the simple sum of 
profit and loss before taxes and is reported in million USD. In the case of Indonesia, the total amount allocated to the country 
is reported in the Table. 
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Put differently, countries with a decrease of less than 13.4 per cent will be relative winners. 
For the results in Table 3, the list of relative winners includes mostly the high tax countries 
like Italy, Japan and the United States, indicating that these countries are suffering from profit 
shifting under the current system of separate accounting. Like the surprise winner Belgium, 
there are some further results that are worth mentioning. Luxembourg and Ireland are 
relative winners compared to their European peers, as is Singapore compared to the major 
economies of Brazil and Mexico. This is most likely due to the fact that ‘total assets’ includes 
intangible assets, and most importantly financial assets. Since these two types of assets are 
used to a non-negligible extent to move profits to more favourable tax jurisdictions, this also 
explains that the redistribution of the corporate tax base is less pronounced than for the other 
apportionment factors.  
 
On a different note, if the apportionment factor results in redistribution into countries with 
significantly higher tax rates, this could also result in higher overall tax revenue. However, 
due to restrictions on the availability of reliable tax rate information, we have not yet 
investigated the tax revenue consequences. In the next subsection we will use a different tax 
base measure to investigate revenue impacts inclusive of the impact of reallocation to higher 
tax countries.  
 
One immediate concern is the role played by losses during the recent financial crisis. The 
results in Table 3 refer to a period of nine years. To investigate whether single crisis years 
are driving the results, Figure 1 shows a box plot over the country-years. Each box plot 
shows the interquartile range of the ratio of the tax base allocated under unitary taxation and 
the tax base allocated under separate accounting, corresponding to the results in column [5]. 
The line inside the box marks the median result and the whiskers are at 1.5 times the 
interquartile range. Yearly values outside this range are displayed as dots. For some 
countries some yearly results are very high and the graph would be difficult to present. Since 
these graphs are for illustrative purposes only, we have set values above 100 per cent to 100 
per cent. In the case of apportionment by total assets this is only relevant for some 
observations in Argentina and Montenegro. The red line represents the overall average, so 
all results above the red line present a country being a relative winner under unitary taxation.  
 
Figure 1 confirms the claim that for most countries the overall result is not driven by extreme 
results during the crisis years. As mentioned above, the two most notable countries where 
single years with extreme losses dominate the results are China and Iceland. This is visible 
through the fact that there are both positive and negative outliers present.  
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Figure 1 Tax base allocation over time: apportionment by total assets 
 
Next we discuss the results for the different apportionment factors. In order to use as much 
of the information as possible, we first simulate the tax revenue effect for each of the 
apportionment factors separately. The detailed results of these simulations can be found in 
Appendix Tables A1-A6.  
 
In the case of tangible assets as apportionment factor, the coverage is only slightly reduced 
and the overall reduction in the tax base of 13.4 per cent remains unchanged. However, the 
distributional effects are markedly different from the scenario in Table 3. Belgium is no longer 
the only relevant gaining country, but rather is in line with most established European 
economies losing tax base to Eastern European countries like Bulgaria, Bosnia Herzegovina, 
Czech Republic, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Poland. In fact the only notable exception in 
Eastern Europe is Hungary, which loses significantly. A result worth mentioning is that 
Switzerland is among the winners, albeit with a very small number of companies backing up 
this result. The case of the large reported losses in China is now even more evident, since 
the simple sum of the profit and losses is negative. These large losses are offset to a large 
extent against taxable profits in the US, resulting in a substantial loss of tax base to the 
United States.  
 
Using turnover as apportionment factor the sample size is slightly further reduced but the 
overall picture regarding the losses and the overall reduction of the tax base is broadly the 
same, with an overall reduction of 10.6 per cent due to international loss consolidation. 
Interestingly the picture from the result with total assets is restored, with high tax countries 
like the United States, Japan and Italy gaining tax base. At the same time the result that 
some of the established European countries lose to Eastern European countries is less 
pronounced. Countries that are commonly associated with a favourable tax system, like 
Luxembourg, Ireland, the Netherlands, Belgium and Switzerland, are now all seen to lose tax 
base. The Swiss case should again be treated with caution due to the small number of 
observations.  
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The results for the number of employees as apportionment factor are based on a roughly 
10 per cent smaller sample with approximately 117,000 individual firms. Nevertheless, the 
international loss consolidation still implies an overall reduction to the tax base of about 12 
per cent, in line with previous results. Appendix Table A3 shows that basing the 
apportionment on the number of employees has vast redistributive consequences. By and 
large all the emerging economies gain a significant proportion of tax base, while some of the 
large established economies, such as Germany, France and the United States, lose 
significantly. Again, those jurisdictions with favourable tax treatment, like the Netherlands, 
Singapore, Ireland, Belgium, and Switzerland, are among the countries losing the largest 
share of their tax base.  
 
The results for apportionment according to the cost of employees suffer from the problem 
that payroll data is not available for some countries like the United States, Mexico, China, 
Singapore, Russia and Australia, and hence the sample is reduced to about 100,000 firms on 
average. The reduction is even more pronounced in the sum of profit and losses, which now 
make up only half of the sum of the baseline case in Table 3 (where total assets is used as 
the apportionment factor). For this reason, direct comparisons to the previous results need to 
be treated cautiously. The next subsection shows the results of re-running the analysis with a 
subsample for which all the apportionment factors are reported, to allow a direct comparison. 
Nevertheless, the main change here, compared to previous results, is that less of the 
Eastern European countries turn out to be winning (unsurprisingly, since these countries 
typically have lower wages). This is in particular true for countries like Romania or Bulgaria. 
Among the few countries winning with cost of employees as apportionment factor is Italy. 
 
For the two-part apportionment mechanism proposed by Avi-Yonah et al (2009), a fixed 
rate of return is first applied to the operating expenses in each country. In the second step 
the residual profit is allocated among countries using an apportionment factor. Note that the 
results here are a strong simplification from the original proposal, which is designed to be 
applied on a case-by-case basis. Due to data limitations it is not possible to identify the 
separate business lines as would be required for such an application, and therefore these 
results should only be seen as a first approximation to the proposal of Avi-Yonah et al. 
(2009). Significant further work would be necessary to provide a direct application. For our 
simulation we first use a 1 per cent return on expenses, and then allocate the residual 
profit according to the country shares of total assets. The overall change in the tax base is in 
line with the other apportionment factors (a reduction of 11.4 per cent). The United States, 
Japan and Italy are among the winners. More surprising is that most of the Eastern European 
countries lose significantly. This is slightly reversed once a 5 per cent return on expenses 
is assumed. In this case the overall reduction of the tax base is somewhat smaller, with only 
10.5 per cent reduction.  
 
Next, to compare directly the different apportionment factors we restrict our sample to those 
firms where we have the necessary information for all apportionment factors. This reduces 
the number of firms to a sample of 85,986 firms on average. The overall impact of loss-
making companies is comparable to the individual results above, with a reduction of 11.7 per 
cent of the overall tax base.  
 
The most striking feature in Table 4 is that the differences between the various 
apportionment factors are very pronounced. Even for countries with relatively good coverage 
like Germany, Italy, France and the United Kingdom, the results differ significantly depending 
on the factor used to apportion the tax base. Further it is striking that total assets affects the 
relative distribution of the tax base the least, most likely due to the above-mentioned fact that 
total assets include financial and intangible assets which are partly used to relocate profits 
under the current system.  
 
  
 
 
23 
Table 4 Baseline results for different apportionment factors  
 
No. 
firms 
Sum
profit and loss 
before taxes
% change under unitary taxation, apportioned by 
Country 
 Total assets Tangible 
assets
Turnover No. employees Payroll Avi-Yonah 
1% return
Avi-Yonah 5% 
return 
Austria 1,040 71,153.69 -21.3% -31.4% -21.7% -34.4% -19.7% -20.7% -17.6% 
Belgium 4,296 293,037.10 29.7% -48.6% -24.8% -46.5% -30.1% 24.7% 6.0% 
Bosnia Herzegovina 185 442.32 -7.2% 165.9% 17.1% 195.8% 24.0% -5.7% 1.6% 
Bulgaria 491 7,866.76 -19.3% 23.3% -15.2% 67.4% -31.7% -18.8% -16.1% 
Croatia 784 6,741.58 -20.3% 4.8% -13.1% 10.9% -17.1% -20.2% -19.1% 
Czech Republic 3,145 67,705.02 -25.5% 28.4% -6.5% 31.4% -26.4% -24.1% -18.6% 
Denmark 1,365 65,639.08 -19.2% -27.9% -23.0% -24.4% -18.4% -19.6% -21.0% 
Estonia 698 6,248.35 -22.1% 7.1% -13.6% 73.2% -23.6% -21.8% -19.5% 
Finland 2,337 63,196.36 -25.6% -24.5% -14.9% -15.6% -15.4% -25.1% -22.7% 
France 16,707 752,573.14 -17.5% -17.3% -11.8% -24.8% -6.8% -16.8% -13.8% 
Germany 4,480 562,141.18 -24.1% -30.5% -14.5% -23.5% -12.4% -23.1% -18.7% 
Hungary 403 16,094.57 -15.7% 26.5% -6.2% 62.4% -22.2% -15.6% -13.9% 
Ireland 702 37,917.33 -12.2% -17.9% -18.4% -44.6% -48.2% -13.4% -16.8% 
Italy 8,716 257,083.65 -4.1% 11.2% 11.4% 8.3% 6.3% -2.9% 2.0% 
Japan 1,535 142,926.62 -2.9% 1.9% -2.0% -1.2% -10.8% -3.9% -3.7% 
Latvia 27 -369.76 51.3% 91.5% 10.1% 116.5% -4.4% 47.2% 35.4% 
Luxembourg 154 47,508.76 -8.4% -76.5% -43.4% -81.2% -77.2% -11.8% -15.5% 
Netherlands 775 91,369.11 -26.5% -44.5% -32.4% -62.7% -61.2% -26.1% -23.5% 
Norway 3,147 154,679.47 -22.0% -10.9% -21.8% -26.6% -20.3% -22.1% -22.5% 
Poland 2,504 67,735.79 -30.7% 33.3% -5.3% 67.4% -31.6% -28.7% -20.4% 
Portugal 1,636 73,624.67 -13.3% -5.6% -11.0% -5.0% -11.9% -13.4% -13.7% 
Romania 2,096 23,749.13 -30.5% 49.6% -7.1% 160.0% -13.3% -29.8% -26.1% 
Serbia 839 1,217.25 -17.8% 75.6% -12.7% 91.0% 5.7% -18.4% -19.2% 
Slovak Republic 800 23,213.89 -10.3% 32.8% 1.2% 39.4% -8.9% -9.9% -7.6% 
Slovenia 192 2,808.68 -16.2% 0.9% -12.5% -1.0% -12.7% -16.1% -15.6% 
South Korea 793 90,274.47 -18.3% -1.4% -13.2% -6.5% -25.7% -18.5% -18.6% 
Spain 9,692 447,315.23 -12.1% -7.6% -15.5% -12.1% -13.3% -12.4% -13.3% 
Sweden 2,514 108,766.46 -10.9% -19.3% -24.6% -29.4% -21.4% -11.9% -15.7% 
Switzerland 20 1,423.89 6.3% 15.6% -18.7% -3.3% -1.2% -2.3% -20.8% 
Taiwan 144 106,711.90 -1.5% -1.6% -2.0% -2.1% -2.9% -1.6% -1.9% 
Ukraine 807 29,419.52 -39.8% -1.3% -19.2% 89.2% -27.2% -38.9% -34.6% 
United Kingdom 12,961 966,003.66 -6.2% -0.5% -7.0% 0.1% 0.8% -6.0% -5.1% 
Total 85,986 4,595,884.80 -11.7% -11.8% -11.7% -11.8% -11.8% -11.7% -11.1% 
Notes: No. firms refers to the average (over the period 2003 to 2011) number of firms these results are based on. All countries with less than 10 firms on average in all apportionment 
factors are excluded. Sum profit and loss refers to the simple sum of profit and loss before taxes and is reported in million USD.  
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The choice of apportionment factors matters most to the lowest-income countries in the 
sample, those of Eastern Europe. Using tangible assets allocates more of the tax base to 
lower-income countries, and most countries of the region are major winners if number of 
employees is used. This result is largely reversed if the cost of employees is used as 
allocation factor.  
 
Figure 2 illustrates the results from Table 4 following the same logic as Figure 1. Regardless 
of the apportionment factors chosen, countries like Luxembourg, Ireland and the Netherlands 
will see a significant share of their tax base allocated away from them – reflecting the 
disproportionally large share of the tax base these jurisdictions have been able to attract 
under the current system of separate accounting.19  
 
 
 
Figure 2 Tax base apportionment: variation across factors 
 
Figure 3 shows the variation across countries for the different apportionment factors. Overall 
it is clear that the redistributive effects of apportionment are far greater for the relatively 
immobile factors – in particular, number of employees (including when compared to payroll), 
and tangible assets (including when compared to total assets). 
                                                            
19  We are grateful to Francis Weyzig for suggesting some caution here, since Orbis may include tax-exempt dividends 
from subsidiaries in its gross profit, and for some jurisdictions with many intermediate holdings such as Luxembourg and 
the Netherlands this may result in systematic overstating of profits under separate accounting. This caution is tempered 
by the fact that IMF (2014) identifies the same jurisdictions as among the ‘conduit’ group which they find would 
consistently lose tax base under any apportionment factor applied to taxation of US-headquartered multinationals.  
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Figure 3 Tax base apportionment: variation across countries  
 
4.2 Tax revenue effects  
 
The analysis so far has concentrated on the distributional effects of unitary taxation on the 
corporate tax base. The question in the background that is really of interest is the difference 
in the extent to which countries would be able to raise tax revenue under the alternative 
system of unitary taxation. To get closer to the answer to this question we repeat the 
simulation exercise from above with a different tax base measure, based on the tax liabilities 
reported in the accounts. Then we compare the tax liabilities resulting from the allocated tax 
base to the sum of the tax liabilities reported under the current system. This approach is in 
line with the methodology of Devereux and Loretz (2008). Comparing the results to the 
previous results, one needs to bear in mind some caveats. First the tax base measure is now 
hinging on the assumption that the top statutory tax rate has been applied to all the taxable 
profits. Secondly we are now comparing our simulation results to the simple sum of reported 
tax liabilities - including negative tax liabilities - which implies that we treat negative tax 
liabilities as paid-out tax rebates. Third, in contrast to the results above, we are not trying to 
separate out the effects from international loss consolidation and loss carry forwards.20 
 
Table 5 reports the results for our simulation of tax revenue distribution using the subsample 
of firms for which all the necessary data about tax liabilities and apportionment factors is 
available. Overall we find a slightly positive effect on tax revenue for all apportionment 
factors with the exception of number of employees. This is due to the fact that apportioning 
according to number of employees allocates a larger share of the tax base to lower-income 
and lower-tax countries in Eastern Europe.  
 
Overall the results for tax liabilities largely confirm the findings from above. Countries with a 
favourable tax system like Ireland and the Netherlands lose tax revenue regardless of the 
apportionment factor/s chosen, while high-income and higher-tax countries like the United 
Kingdom and Spain win under all scenarios. For Bosnia Herzegovina and Serbia we get 
rather extreme positive results. This is most likely reflecting the fact that deriving a tax base 
measure based on tax liabilities divided by the statutory tax rate is subject to substantial 
measurement error in young nation states with generous tax holidays.  
                                                            
20  Doing so would put even more emphasis on our tax burden measure which hinges on the crucial assumption that all tax 
base is subject to the statutory tax rate. We have done this analysis and results show approximately a 7 per cent 
decrease in the benchmark tax base, changing the result to a larger positive effect overall.  
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The other conclusion that can reliably be drawn is that the different apportionment factors 
result in very different distribution of tax liabilities. In line with our baseline results, 
apportionment by number of employees strongly favours lower-income countries, while 
apportionment by cost of employees allocates the tax base to the richer economies.  
 
Our results are also broadly in line with the recent analysis of IMF (2014), which uses data 
on US-headquartered multinational groups to show a strong positive effect for emerging 
economies and developing countries (e.g. China, India and South Africa) when using 
employment as the apportionment factor. The IMF study also finds a group of consistent 
losers (regardless of apportionment factor), namely the conduit jurisdictions of Bermuda, 
Ireland, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Singapore and Switzerland. Once these are taken out of 
the analysis, advanced economies taken together see tax base increases of a quarter to a 
half, depending on the apportionment factor. 
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Table 5 Results for tax reported, balanced subsample for different apportionment factors  
Country No. 
firms 
Sum
reported 
tax liabilities
% change under unitary taxation, apportioned by 
  Total assets Tangible 
assets
Turnover No. employees Payroll Avi-Yonah 
1% return
Avi-Yonah  
5% return 
Austria 936 17,435.76 -16.7% -24.4% -13.2% -33.6% -10.5% -16.1% -12.6% 
Belgium 3,714 35,907.10 145.9% 2.1% 51.6% 0.7% 28.7% 132.3% 90.8% 
Bosnia Herzegovina 185 39.41 74.5% 287.5% 94.9% 329.0% 92.0% 75.8% 92.7% 
Bulgaria 491 1,093.64 -5.1% 25.7% -7.6% 65.9% -28.4% -6.0% -7.2% 
Croatia 784 1,607.59 -7.4% 19.0% -0.9% 23.1% -8.7% -7.7% -6.2% 
Czech Republic 3,145 13,468.11 -23.5% 23.6% -7.2% 24.9% -29.7% -21.6% -12.8% 
Denmark 1,365 21,051.29 -16.2% -28.2% -12.1% -20.1% -14.1% -16.6% -17.5% 
Estonia 533 516.35 -1.5% 14.5% -6.9% 85.6% -19.5% -0.7% 7.3% 
Finland 2,122 11,499.48 -13.8% -13.3% -6.5% -7.8% -7.3% -13.0% -7.7% 
France 16,706 160,761.14 4.4% 4.5% 12.5% -2.5% 20.8% 5.9% 12.4% 
Germany 4,249 141,524.73 -14.8% -20.9% 1.5% -14.6% -1.1% -13.1% -4.4% 
Hungary 340 2,045.87 -9.7% 61.4% 15.2% 89.7% -7.7% -9.7% 0.2% 
Ireland 730 5,277.63 -20.3% -33.2% -25.1% -55.2% -57.9% -20.8% -21.1% 
Italy 8,716 138,309.47 -12.2% -7.3% -4.6% -0.1% -2.1% -11.1% -6.1% 
Japan 1,535 49,283.03 1.8% 5.6% 0.4% 4.8% -7.0% 0.3% 2.2% 
Latvia 27 40.70 28.0% 46.3% -10.5% 42.5% -22.2% 25.0% 16.1% 
Luxembourg 142 4,398.86 101.9% -62.8% -6.9% -68.0% -63.6% 87.0% 63.0% 
Netherlands 751 26,917.74 -23.5% -24.4% -20.8% -60.7% -59.7% -23.2% -18.3% 
Norway 3,147 55,837.13 -27.1% -18.1% -34.4% -46.8% -39.4% -27.2% -27.6% 
Poland 2,311 12,919.87 -33.5% 12.3% -14.1% 75.3% -33.7% -31.0% -20.3% 
Portugal 1,594 13,442.49 -17.2% -8.1% -13.5% -6.2% -13.5% -17.4% -17.1% 
Romania 2,096 6,718.75 -29.2% 27.3% -26.3% 110.4% -14.8% -28.7% -25.5% 
Serbia 839 227.88 144.5% 365.5% 113.2% 406.3% 166.4% 140.0% 132.0% 
Slovak Republic 800 4,799.56 -14.4% 21.4% -8.1% 26.9% -16.8% -14.0% -11.1% 
Slovenia 158 650.42 -6.9% 15.9% -3.5% 10.3% -3.7% -6.6% -4.4% 
South Korea 701 22,996.31 -14.8% -2.6% -12.8% -6.6% -21.9% -14.9% -13.9% 
Spain 9,083 99,009.29 18.6% 23.3% 14.6% 17.9% 16.9% 18.1% 17.3% 
Sweden 2,514 19,533.51 6.3% -2.7% -6.2% -11.0% -2.6% 4.2% -1.3% 
Switzerland 18 213.86 5.6% 29.6% -34.8% 19.8% 16.6% -6.8% -35.7% 
Taiwan 144 12,900.70 6.7% 6.6% 6.1% 6.0% 5.0% 6.5% 5.7% 
Ukraine 807 10,098.12 -40.5% -22.8% -31.8% 21.3% -35.2% -39.9% -36.4% 
United Kingdom 11,662 216,528.84 11.6% 17.2% 7.5% 17.1% 19.9% 11.9% 13.7% 
Total 82,345 1,107,054.60 2.0% 0.5% 1.8% -0.2% 2.3% 2.0% 4.1% 
Notes: No. firms refers to the average (over the period 2003-2011) number of firms these results are based on. All countries with less than 10 firms on average in all apportionment factors 
are excluded. Sum reported tax liabilities refers to the simple sum of the tax liabilities in the accounts and is reported in million USD.  
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4.3 Results using segmental reporting  
 
Table 6 reports the results for our analysis of segmental reporting in the consolidated reports. 
In the spirit of Shakelford and Slemrod (1998), we only look at the profit share of the home 
country. Specifically we calculate how much of the profits would be allocated to the home 
country if the share of the profit in the home country is in line with the share of assets or 
sales in the home country.  
 
Table 6 Results for profit allocation using segmental reporting 
Country No. firms Observations Sum of profits % of profit allocated through
  Sales factor Assets factor
Australia 535 1,682 90,382.26 90.3% 89.4%
Austria 23 82 6,495.57 111.4% 99.9%
Belgium 16 60 5,100.46 110.8% 94.4%
Canada 224 847 83,509.59 84.5% 89.1%
China 14 30 5,578.79 98.9% 98.9%
Finland 17 74 2,891.00 91.5% 84.1%
France 123 389 140,939.60 105.6% 108.6%
Germany 91 285 86,096.82 64.6% 81.1%
Greece 34 108 11,485.55 97.5% 99.0%
Hongkong 55 202 51,369.61 73.7% 79.7%
India 54 134 9,386.00 97.8% 96.5%
Indonesia 42 141 16,962.06 100.0% 99.8%
Ireland 19 63 2,501.98 97.9% 58.5%
Israel 91 354 13,216.50 63.9% 88.7%
Japan 1,038 6,787 1,030,347.00 93.6% 97.6%
Kenya 11 53 1,255.62 88.2% 90.0%
Kuwait 41 124 7,212.39 58.9% 54.5%
Malaysia 209 697 20,335.22 83.2% 74.9%
Netherlands 22 104 16,155.52 87.3% 68.5%
New Zealand 46 236 8,940.33 78.2% 75.7%
Norway 21 64 4,283.28 84.0% 87.3%
Oman 10 27 281.22 101.1% 113.2%
Philipines 13 49 3,025.44 90.5% 83.3%
Singapore 89 411 18,379.39 71.9% 69.0%
South Africa 76 256 51,065.13 86.6% 74.7%
Sri Lanka 10 62 654.80 126.5% 101.2%
Sweden 46 143 5,018.42 79.2% 61.6%
Switzerland 16 46 159,352.90 9.1% 91.4%
Taiwan 217 1,106 14,703.73 80.2% 84.9%
Thailand 80 324 20,698.70 91.9% 79.8%
Turkey 13 38 2,224.60 94.1% 101.5%
United Kingdom 371 1,340 159,053.70 105.7% 100.8%
Total 3,667 16,318 2,048,903.18 85.8% 94.5%
Notes: Sum of profits refers to sum of profits in the home country and is in million USD.  
 
Our result implies that the share of profits at home are on average 15 per cent higher than 
the share of sales at home, and about 5 per cent higher than assets. This is in stark contrast 
to the results of Shackelford and Slemrod (1998), who find a disproportionately large share of 
the tax base of US multinationals abroad. 
 
This difference is most likely due to the fact that we use the profit measure from the 
segmental reports, while Shackelford and Slemrod (1998) infer the taxable income from the 
footnotes of the tax provisions. It is also possible, however, that particular differences in the 
US approach (e.g. to worldwide corporate income taxation, and the tax implications of profit 
repatriation) result in US-headquartered multinationals displaying some important differences 
in tax behaviour from others. Apart from the unrealistic outlier Switzerland in the case of the 
sales factor, the usual suspects of Ireland and Singapore are seen to lose a large share of 
their profits. However, the overall results are mainly driven by Japan, which makes up one-
third of the companies and two-thirds of the profits. This highlights once again that the 
analysis faces quite severe data limitations, while also confirming the importance of using 
available data to understand more about the differences in tax behaviour of multinational 
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groups headquartered in different economies (rather than relying, for example, on data for 
US-headquartered multinationals only).  
 
 
5  Conclusion  
 
The analysis here shows large variations between the location of real economic activity and 
the extent of profit declaration, or, equivalently, the difference between potential formulary 
apportionment mechanisms under a putative unitary taxation system in comparison to the 
current system of separate accounting.  
 
The choice of apportionment factors is, unsurprisingly, of considerable importance. The 
different apportionment factors will result in very different redistributive outcomes. While total 
assets will change the relative allocation the least (with a surprise winner, Belgium), 
apportioning according to the number of employees will create the biggest redistribution. 
 
Between the apportionment factors based on employment, apportionment according to 
payroll will harm the lowest-income countries in the sample (in Eastern Europe), while 
apportionment according to the number of employees will increase the size of their tax base. 
  
By and large a shift to unitary taxation will – regardless of the apportionment factor – shift 
corporate tax base away from countries with ‘favourable’ tax regimes, for example, 
Luxembourg, the Netherlands and Ireland, which will see a smaller tax base under all 
scenarios.  
 
In general the move towards unitary taxation results in a drop in corporate tax base of about 
12 per cent due to international loss consolidation. It remains to be seen to what extent this 
reflects the global financial crisis falling into the period of analysis. Further work is also 
needed to investigate the extent to which this reflects a genuine reduction in the tax base, 
rather than being a feature of the sample period length or other components of the analysis. 
 
The clearest result of this study, however, is that there is insufficient data to perform a full 
analysis of the revenue implications of a shift to unitary taxation – or, equivalently, of the 
scale of misalignment between corporate profits and the distribution of actual business 
activity. This is most glaringly true with respect to developing countries, which despite the 
global nature of the Orbis dataset are effectively excluded once the sample is required to 
include the standard set of possible apportionment factors.21 Further analysis with the current 
data may yield additional insights into patterns of profit distribution by income level, but such 
a sample cannot be relied upon to reveal a great deal about the pattern across developing 
countries of different regions, income levels and economic structure. 
 
Nevertheless, the results at hand suggest that apportionment by number of employees in 
particular would have a very strong distributive effect – and these are likely, by and large, to 
have opposing tax base effects for the industrialised and lower-income countries. The 
possibility of redistribution of the tax base away from jurisdictions in which profit declaration 
is disproportionate to real economic activity, however, raises the possibility that unitary 
taxation could deliver benefits for most countries – while posing a significant threat to those 
that benefit most from the current system. 
  
                                                            
21  As such, these findings indicate a serious obstacle for the OECD’s commitment to evaluate BEPS progress in reducing 
the misalignment of profits. 
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Appendix 
 
Table A1 Baseline results for tangible assets as apportionment factor 
No. 
firms 
Sum profit and 
loss before taxes
% change through 
group relief and 
losses carried 
forward
% change under unitary taxation
Relative to [2] Relative to tax base 
measure underlying 
[3]
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5]
Argentina 15 679.31 36.6% 996.3% 702.3%
Australia 221 118,671.47 15.0% 104.8% 78.0%
Austria 2200 114,972.43 22.8% -10.4% -27.0%
Belgium 5896 317,305.82 8.7% 6.0% -2.5%
Bosnia Herzegovina 207 583.15 95.9% 298.7% 103.5%
Brazil 227 82,330.73 6.3% 41.3% 33.0%
Bulgaria 538 8,053.23 35.6% 176.1% 103.6%
Chile 20 38,317.72 0.5% 98.2% 97.2%
China 135 -10,915.30 -574.7% -615.7% 8.6%
Colombia 291 29,608.19 5.5% 33.6% 26.6%
Croatia 850 6,785.12 60.5% 171.8% 69.3%
Czech Republic 3805 69,590.77 14.7% 148.7% 116.8%
Denmark 2157 101,241.94 35.1% -7.4% -31.5%
Estonia 1048 10,316.57 14.9% 136.3% 105.6%
Finland 2911 80,753.03 27.2% 3.9% -18.4%
France 22862 1,103,884.70 23.3% 11.3% -9.7%
Germany 10348 696,244.91 28.3% 6.9% -16.7%
Greece 889 22,877.44 31.0% 27.5% -2.7%
Hungary 723 78,962.95 9.7% -29.3% -35.5%
Iceland 105 -5,325.67 -151.5% -447.1% 574.5%
India 19 3,744.46 4.7% -2.8% -7.1%
Ireland 1691 52,961.56 145.5% 139.0% -2.6%
Italy 11519 270,947.28 54.7% 1.14 0.39
Japan 4624 385,199.07 4.7% 13.4% 8.3%
Kazakhstan 69 3,050.68 44.0% -10.6% -37.9%
Latvia 391 1,693.06 85.3% 173.5% 47.6%
Lithuania 368 7,740.78 15.9% 10.2% -4.9%
Luxembourg 814 76,226.26 147.8% -43.1% -77.0%
Malta 130 17,073.28 20.3% -59.9% -66.6%
Mexico 165 5,637.23 131.3% 229.9% 42.7%
Netherlands 3,721 555,174.27 27.8% -38.1% -51.6%
New Zealand 99 3,537.64 8.9% 631.0% 571.2%
Norway 6,056 396,552.21 12.8% 8.6% -3.7%
Peru 49 17,952.67 0.6% 7.8% 7.2%
Philippines 152 9,316.50 7.6% 74.9% 62.6%
Poland 4,342 108,176.58 21.2% 154.7% 110.2%
Portugal 2,334 96,366.79 16.6% 14.8% -1.5%
Romania 2,455 22,765.96 60.5% 278.4% 135.7%
Russia 2,925 271,472.46 8.3% 17.8% 8.7%
Serbia 880 1,182.40 530.9% 1426.8% 142.0%
Singapore 400 167,128.14 3.3% -1.2% -4.3%
Slovak Republic 878 24,606.81 24.5% 102.2% 62.4%
Slovenia 199 2,815.45 50.4% 74.3% 15.9%
South Korea 997 440,381.87 6.7% 9.6% 2.7%
Spain 10,969 474,881.73 35.2% 40.7% 4.0%
Sweden 4,719 290,534.19 33.3% 0.8% -24.4%
Switzerland 29 1,890.89 3.1% 40.3% 36.1%
Taiwan 155 110,691.72 15.6% 13.7% -1.6%
Turkey 66 18,162.09 4.1% -31.9% -34.5%
Ukraine 863 29,470.53 19.7% 70.5% 42.5%
United Kingdom 22,869 3,086,419.30 57.0% 7.6% -31.5%
United States 633 78,762.12 11.2% -61.2% -65.1%
Total 141,029 9,897,454.40 34.9% 16.8% -13.4%
Notes: No. firms refers to the average (over the period 2003-2011) number of firms these results are based on. All countries 
with less than 10 firms on average in all apportionment factors are excluded. Sum profit and loss refers to the simple sum of 
profit and loss before taxes and is reported in million USD.  
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Table A2 Baseline results for turnover as apportionment factor 
No. 
firms 
Sum profit and 
loss before taxes
% change through 
group relief and 
losses carried 
forward
% change under unitary taxation
Relative to [2] Relative to tax base 
measure underlying
[3]
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5]
Argentina 15 679.31 36.6% 212.4% 128.6%
Australia 236 244,682.32 7.6% 3.3% -4.0%
Austria 2,074 139,916.53 23.4% 13.0% -8.5%
Belgium 5,103 302,184.11 33.5% 25.1% -6.3%
Bosnia Herzegovina 217 964.58 73.2% 114.7% 24.0%
Brazil 246 84,875.08 6.1% -9.1% -14.3%
Bulgaria 551 12,562.62 23.7% 48.7% 20.2%
Chile 20 38,317.72 0.5% 21.3% 20.7%
China 750 22,505.55 305.3% 331.6% 6.5%
Colombia 293 30,030.67 5.5% 5.2% -0.2%
Croatia 870 13,146.01 32.7% 14.2% -14.0%
Czech Republic 3,838 95,971.15 10.9% 13.1% 2.0%
Denmark 1,048 107,910.18 20.0% 12.6% -6.2%
Estonia 1,044 11,827.00 13.1% 8.3% -4.3%
Finland 2,989 106,727.82 20.1% 11.7% -7.0%
France 23,112 1388,937.60 20.6% 1.5% -15.9%
Germany 7,760 755,292.29 29.5% 28.8% -0.5%
Greece 896 1,052.47 4,267.6% 4,609.7% 7.8%
Hungary 754 89,177.65 9.8% 14.7% 4.4%
Iceland 79 -4,629.17 -192.7% -163.3% -31.7%
India 337 23,168.04 31.7% 20.8% -8.3%
Indonesia 12 0.00 0.0% 629.22 629.22
Ireland 1,513 111,601.91 36.1% 10.2% -19.0%
Italy 11,678 387,362.78 50.2% 83.4% 22.1%
Japan 4642 522,716.17 4.9% 7.4% 2.4%
Kazakhstan 69 3,050.68 44.0% -72.8% -81.1%
Latvia 469 1,570.68 210.5% 308.9% 31.7%
Lithuania 396 8,092.88 28.7% 30.5% 1.4%
Luxembourg 800 123,284.28 93.2% -17.6% -57.3%
Macedonia 14 373.79 15.9% -0.7% -14.3%
Malta 135 18,844.27 19.1% -60.4% -66.8%
Mexico 211 35,747.76 21.7% -24.6% -38.0%
Montenegro 12 231.01 79.3% 77.7% -0.9%
Netherlands 2,096 479,940.33 15.0% -36.7% -45.0%
New Zealand 99 3,544.63 8.9% 91.1% 75.5%
Norway 5,854 433,816.23 11.1% -12.2% -21.0%
Peru 23 17,178.90 0.3% -28.3% -28.5%
Philippines 164 10,797.01 7.0% 16.1% 8.5%
Poland 4,435 157,230.41 14.8% 27.9% 11.4%
Portugal 2,242 103,834.66 17.6% 8.3% -8.0%
Romania 2,429 27,055.46 54.0% 95.8% 27.1%
Russia 2,964 349,608.91 6.8% -4.7% -10.7%
Serbia 896 2,685.57 249.7% 267.7% 5.2%
Singapore 398 168,851.78 3.3% 33.6% 29.4%
Slovak Republic 890 26,243.08 24.0% 51.0% 21.8%
Slovenia 209 5,220.62 45.6% 44.2% -0.9%
South Korea 1,041 455,201.92 8.5% -5.0% -12.5%
Spain 10,889 563,882.29 31.3% 20.7% -8.0%
Sweden 4,753 379,287.60 27.2% -11.3% -30.3%
Switzerland 132 61,215.76 10.9% 2.4% -7.6%
Taiwan 155 110,691.72 15.6% 9.0% -5.6%
Turkey 86 37,827.20 3.7% -11.0% -14.2%
Ukraine 858 30,098.81 22.0% 21.5% -0.4%
United Kingdom 19003 2331675.30 17.1% 0.7% -14.0%
United States 667 220929.70 7.4% 4.0% -3.2%
Total 132,468 10,654,994.00 21.1% 8.3% -10.6%
Notes: No. firms refers to the average (over the period 2003-2011) number of firms these results are based on. All countries 
with less than 10 firms on average in all apportionment factors are excluded. Sum profit and loss refers to the simple sum of 
profit and loss before taxes and is reported in million USD. In the case of Indonesia, the total amount allocated to the country 
is reported in the Table. 
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Table A3 Baseline results for number of employees as apportionment factor 
No. 
firms 
Sum profit and 
loss before taxes
% change through 
group relief and 
losses carried 
forward
% change under unitary taxation
Relative to [2] Relative to tax base 
measure underlying 
[3]
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5]
Australia 180 79,781.14 17.6% 30.5% 11.0%
Austria 1,649 100,914.31 24.3% -11.3% -28.6%
Belgium 5,221 299,774.80 20.7% -24.5% -37.5%
Bosnia Herzegovina 213 951.35 73.6% 447.6% 215.4%
Brazil 106 24,244.44 7.7% 83.7% 70.6%
Bulgaria 565 11,362.86 25.9% 168.4% 113.2%
China 753 22,021.44 310.2% 688.0% 92.1%
Colombia 39 4,900.26 2.2% 69.6% 65.9%
Croatia 801 12,986.39 31.6% 77.9% 35.2%
Czech Republic 3,232 89,309.41 10.4% 49.6% 35.5%
Denmark 1,876 125,678.66 23.9% 0.8% -18.7%
Estonia 950 8,945.49 13.5% 93.4% 70.4%
Finland 2,554 102,024.70 19.5% 7.2% -10.3%
France 22,015 1,222,765.40 22.2% -15.7% -31.0%
Germany 6,134 636,147.43 28.9% 9.8% -14.8%
Greece 761 -645.07 -6,755.2% -6,372.0% -5.8%
Hungary 425 26,194.30 24.8% 101.3% 61.3%
Iceland 15 -1,722.93 -235.7% -130.0% -77.9%
India 13 4,171.51 10.8% 80.6% 63.0%
Indonesia 12 0.00 0.0% 2,722,10 2,722,10
Ireland 843 46,255.70 55.0% -26.0% -52.3%
Italy 8,870 370,223.24 43.5% 62.8% 13.4%
Japan 4,591 461,728.98 4.4% 0.7% -3.5%
Kazakhstan 34 1,564.28 12.1% 292.4% 250.0%
Latvia 475 2,186.78 121.5% 529.0% 184.0%
Lithuania 399 8,032.72 28.7% 107.1% 60.9%
Luxembourg 244 87,114.93 4.6% -65.5% -67.0%
Macedonia 12 268.46 10.5% 377.2% 331.8%
Malta 33 6,569.62 3.3% -11.2% -14.1%
Mexico 105 23,409.30 2.4% -1.1% -3.5%
Montenegro 11 207.56 87.1% 248.6% 86.3%
Netherlands 3,144 466,052.55 15.9% -65.1% -69.9%
Norway 3,622 258,740.74 9.2% -37.5% -42.8%
Peru 13 2,089.58 3.4% 33.3% 28.9%
Philippines 19 2,795.86 3.8% 33.2% 28.4%
Poland 3,464 108,617.96 11.6% 136.0% 111.6%
Portugal 1,689 81,559.07 16.0% 7.4% -7.4%
Romania 2,408 26,525.57 53.9% 372.9% 207.3%
Russia 2,730 263,472.06 8.2% 24.1% 14.6%
Serbia 893 2,568.20 260.0% 746.1% 135.0%
Singapore 58 15,244.92 6.6% -45.9% -49.3%
Slovak Republic 819 24,831.20 24.7% 112.6% 70.5%
Slovenia 206 4,940.46 47.8% 42.1% -3.9%
South Korea 998 432,469.86 8.9% 1.8% -6.5%
Spain 9,755 471,178.72 32.0% 21.4% -8.0%
Sweden 6,668 346,056.55 31.6% -20.5% -39.6%
Switzerland 85 30,531.40 15.9% 15.9% 0.0%
Taiwan 145 106,733.12 15.9% 8.8% -6.1%
Turkey 29 19,134.29 3.4% -12.7% -15.6%
Ukraine 854 29,868.91 20.8% 170.8% 124.2%
United Kingdom 16,200 1,273,338.40 29.6% 27.1% -1.9%
United States 329 135,182.67 4.8% -19.2% -22.9%
Total 117,259 7,879,299.60 23.5% 9.2% -11.6%
Notes: No. firms refers to the average (over the period 2003-2011) number of firms these results are based on. All countries 
with less than 10 firms on average in all apportionment factors are excluded. Sum profit and loss refers to the simple sum of 
profit and loss before taxes and is reported in million USD.  
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Table A4 Baseline results for payroll as apportionment factor 
 
No. 
firms 
Sum profit and 
loss before taxes
% change through 
group relief and 
losses carried 
forward
% change under unitary taxation
Relative to [2] Relative to tax base 
measure underlying 
[3]
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5]
Austria 1,550 105,202.21 23.6% -0.2% -19.2%
Belgium 5,330 304,742.55 8.3% -22.6% -28.6%
Bosnia Herzegovina 186 442.28 99.1% 163.1% 32.1%
Bulgaria 493 7,876.77 34.7% -7.5% -31.3%
Croatia 794 6,736.11 60.1% 30.9% -18.2%
Czech Republic 3,296 68,575.50 13.8% -15.1% -25.4%
Denmark 1,698 86,164.62 24.7% -2.2% -21.5%
Estonia 744 7,518.64 9.1% -12.6% -19.9%
Finland 2,672 64,141.99 23.9% 6.0% -14.4%
France 17,015 763,198.33 20.3% 16.4% -3.3%
Germany 6,678 631,807.26 24.1% 10.1% -11.3%
Hungary 696 77,996.68 9.2% -10.7% -18.2%
Iceland 37 321.36 320.9% 173.0% -35.2%
India 287 20,935.65 33.1% -20.0% -39.9%
Ireland 798 33,629.19 49.0% -20.2% -46.4%
Italy 9,972 268,381.46 48.6% 60.5% 8.1%
Japan 1,547 143,429.24 6.1% -4.4% -9.9%
Latvia 33 -366.32 -163.9% -162.3% -2.4%
Luxembourg 466 72,042.12 88.5% -62.0% -79.8%
Malta 12 1,563.73 3.7% -0.87 -0.88
Netherlands 1,092 103,691.86 24.1% -47.2% -57.5%
New Zealand 83 2,883.43 8.5% 23.9% 14.3%
Norway 3,986 209,153.57 15.0% -4.2% -16.6%
Poland 3,378 75,266.17 18.6% -17.7% -30.6%
Portugal 2,065 83,758.37 15.9% 1.8% -12.2%
Romania 2,125 23,731.93 52.4% 34.6% -11.6%
Serbia 839 1,217.36 511.8% 562.5% 8.3%
Slovak Republic 850 23,723.78 25.3% 13.6% -9.3%
Slovenia 194 2,810.07 49.1% 35.9% -8.8%
South Korea 847 91,476.30 8.3% -18.6% -24.8%
Spain 10,017 448,961.80 31.5% 18.1% -10.2%
Sweden 3,714 109,706.61 26.5% 2.9% -18.6%
Switzerland 25 1,760.38 3.3% 2.9% -0.4%
Taiwan 149 109,360.05 15.6% 11.2% -3.8%
Ukraine 809 29,418.27 19.6% -10.5% -25.2%
United Kingdom 15,318 1,176,679.20 24.0% 19.5% -3.7%
Total 99,795 5,157,938.50 24.0% 8.9% -12.2%
Notes: No. firms refers to the average (over the period 2003-2011) number of firms these results are based on. All countries 
with less than 10 firms on average in all apportionment factors are excluded. Sum profit and loss refers to the simple sum of 
profit and loss before taxes and is reported in million USD.  
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Table A5 Baseline results for two-part apportionment factor according to Avi-Yonah et 
al (2009) - 1 per cent return in the first stage 
 
No. 
firms 
Sum profit and 
loss before taxes
% change through 
group relief and 
losses carried 
forward
% change under unitary taxation
Relative to [2] Relative to tax base 
measure underlying 
[3]
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5]
Argentina 15 679.31 36.6% 142.0% 77.1%
Australia 217 115,438.90 16.0% 1.3% -12.7%
Austria 1,714 120,656.35 24.0% -8.9% -26.6%
Belgium 5,046 322,423.56 8.7% 30.3% 19.8%
Bosnia Herzegovina 207 583.15 95.9% 88.4% -3.8%
Brazil 227 82,330.71 6.3% -30.5% -34.6%
Bulgaria 532 8,115.74 35.3% 28.5% -5.0%
Chile 20 38,317.72 0.5% -76.7% -76.8%
China 746 22,266.76 308.6% 250.1% -14.3%
Colombia 293 30,030.67 5.5% -16.4% -20.7%
Croatia 850 6,785.12 60.5% 15.0% -28.4%
Czech Republic 3,806 69,699.03 14.7% -17.9% -28.4%
Denmark 1,027 72,210.97 27.3% 19.7% -5.9%
Estonia 1,035 10,118.51 14.6% -26.5% -35.9%
Finland 2,979 81,690.75 25.9% -9.3% -27.9%
France 22,860 1,102,099.90 23.3% 3.2% -16.3%
Germany 6,438 679,911.50 27.5% 3.6% -18.7%
Greece 886 22,885.83 31.0% -16.2% -36.0%
Hungary 733 79,875.45 9.3% -63.1% -66.3%
Iceland 74 -2,723.36 -192.9% -195.4% 2.7%
India 335 22,444.06 31.7% -19.8% -39.1%
Indonesia 12 0.00 0.0% 898.24 898.24
Ireland 1,448 85,179.63 42.2% 0.38 -0.03
Italy 11,515 270,947.16 54.7% 49.3% -3.5%
Japan 4,624 385,199.06 4.7% -0.3% -4.7%
Kazakhstan 69 3,050.68 44.0% -76.1% -83.4%
Latvia 328 1,138.42 120.0% 89.6% -13.8%
Lithuania 368 7,748.07 15.8% 1.3% -12.5%
Luxembourg 716 78,445.94 144.4% 122.0% -9.1%
Malta 130 17,073.28 20.3% -33.7% -44.8%
Mexico 190 35,121.27 22.1% -47.6% -57.1%
Netherlands 2,061 419,228.47 14.2% 21.2% 6.1%
New Zealand 99 3,544.63 8.9% -34.0% -39.4%
Norway 5,839 394,857.69 12.2% -14.3% -23.6%
Peru 23 17,105.41 0.3% -36.5% -36.7%
Philippines 164 9,949.23 7.6% -30.4% -35.3%
Poland 4,387 109,731.63 20.6% -22.4% -35.7%
Portugal 2,220 91,685.90 15.9% -9.0% -21.5%
Romania 2,408 22,782.67 60.4% 17.7% -26.6%
Russia 2,925 271,472.47 8.3% -15.3% -21.8%
Serbia 880 1,182.40 530.9% 394.6% -21.6%
Slovak Republic 878 24,606.82 24.5% 4.0% -16.5%
Slovenia 195 2,807.39 49.3% 26.8% -15.1%
South Korea 976 440,840.41 6.5% -5.2% -11.0%
Spain 10,824 476,193.31 34.5% 3.8% -22.8%
Sweden 4,599 290,445.63 31.3% -0.6% -24.3%
Switzerland 35 1,899.52 3.1% 842.5% 814.5%
Taiwan 155 110,691.72 15.6% 10.5% -4.3%
Turkey 66 18,162.09 4.1% -33.6% -36.1%
Ukraine 848 29,469.10 19.7% -22.6% -35.3%
United Kingdom 18,647 2,029,639.40 16.6% 18.0% 1.1%
United States 442 79,045.30 11.1% 13.6% 2.2%
Total 128,110 8,615,085.30 21.6% 7.7% -11.4%
Notes: No. firms refers to the average (over the period 2003-2011) number of firms these results are based on. All countries 
with less than 10 firms on average in all apportionment factors are excluded. Sum profit and loss refers to the simple sum of 
profit and loss before taxes and is reported in million USD. In the case of Indonesia, the total amount allocated to the country 
is reported in the Table. 
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Table A6 Baseline results for two-part apportionment factor according to Avi-Yonah et 
al (2009) - 5 per cent return in the first stage 
No. 
firms 
Sum profit and 
loss before taxes
% change through 
group relief and 
losses carried 
forward
% change under unitary taxation
Relative to [2] Relative to tax base 
measure underlying 
[3]
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5]
Argentina 15 679.31 36.6% 134.0% 71.2%
Australia 217 115,438.90 16.0% 7.4% -7.4%
Austria 1,714 120,656.35 24.0% -0.8% -20.0%
Belgium 5,046 322,423.55 8.7% 24.6% 14.6%
Bosnia Herzegovina 207 583.15 95.9% 113.2% 8.9%
Brazil 227 82,330.71 6.3% -26.1% -30.4%
Bulgaria 532 8,115.74 35.3% 51.9% 12.3%
Chile 20 38,317.72 0.5% -76.2% -76.3%
China 746 22,266.77 308.6% 277.7% -7.6%
Colombia 293 30,030.67 5.5% -10.8% -15.4%
Croatia 850 6,785.12 60.5% 25.2% -22.0%
Czech Republic 3,806 69,699.03 14.7% -1.3% -13.9%
Denmark 1,027 72,210.97 27.3% 17.0% -8.1%
Estonia 1,035 10,118.51 14.6% -18.0% -28.5%
Finland 2,979 81,690.75 25.9% -1.3% -21.6%
France 22,860 1,102,099.90 23.3% 5.7% -14.2%
Germany 6,438 679,911.52 27.5% 11.3% -12.7%
Greece 886 22,885.83 31.0% 0.5% -23.3%
Hungary 733 79,875.46 9.3% -43.6% -48.4%
Iceland 74 -2,723.36 -192.9% -193.2% 0.4%
India 335 22,444.07 31.7% -8.6% -30.6%
Indonesia 12 0.00 0.0% 430.18 430.18
Ireland 1,448 85,179.62 42.2% 0.31 -0.08
Italy 11,515 270,947.15 54.7% 68.7% 9.1%
Japan 4,624 385,199.07 4.7% 7.0% 2.2%
Kazakhstan 69 3,050.68 44.0% -80.0% -86.1%
Latvia 328 1,138.42 120.0% 152.7% 14.9%
Lithuania 368 7,748.07 15.8% 5.7% -8.7%
Luxembourg 716 78,445.94 144.4% 91.8% -21.5%
Malta 130 17,073.28 20.3% -44.3% -53.7%
Mexico 190 35,121.27 22.1% -34.0% -45.9%
Netherlands 2,061 419,228.46 14.2% 5.8% -7.4%
New Zealand 99 3,544.63 8.9% -11.6% -18.8%
Norway 5,839 394,857.68 12.2% -13.9% -23.3%
Peru 23 17,105.41 0.3% -35.3% -35.5%
Philippines 164 9,949.23 7.6% -8.8% -15.3%
Poland 4,387 109,731.63 20.6% -5.3% -21.4%
Portugal 2,220 91,685.90 15.9% -5.5% -18.4%
Romania 2,408 22,782.67 60.4% 35.8% -15.3%
Russia 2,925 271,472.46 8.3% -14.3% -20.8%
Serbia 880 1,182.40 530.9% 439.5% -14.5%
Slovak Republic 878 24,606.82 24.5% 19.2% -4.3%
Slovenia 195 2,807.39 49.3% 30.4% -12.7%
South Korea 976 440,840.41 6.5% -7.1% -12.7%
Spain 10,824 476,193.33 34.5% 12.7% -16.2%
Sweden 4,599 290,445.61 31.3% -3.1% -26.2%
Switzerland 35 1,899.52 3.1% 699.0% 675.2%
Taiwan 155 110,691.72 15.6% 10.4% -4.5%
Turkey 66 18,162.09 4.1% -24.7% -27.6%
Ukraine 848 29,469.10 19.7% -14.0% -28.2%
United Kingdom 18,647 2,029,639.30 16.6% 13.6% -2.6%
United States 442 79,045.29 11.1% 12.8% 1.6%
Total 128,110 8,615,085.20 21.6% 8.9% -10.5%
 
Notes: No. firms refers to the average (over the period 2003-2011) number of firms these results are based on. All countries 
with less than 10 firms on average in all apportionment factors are excluded. Sum profit and loss refers to the simple sum of 
profit and loss before taxes and is reported in million USD. In the case of Indonesia, the total amount allocated to the country 
is reported in the Table. 
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